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Abstract
Are positive duties to help others in need mere informal duties of
virtue or can they also be enforceable duties of justice? In this paper I
defend the claim that some positive duties (which I call basic positive
duties) can be duties of justice against one of the most important prin-
cipled objections to it. This is the libertarian challenge, according to
which only negative duties to avoid harming others can be duties of
justice, whereas positive duties (basic or nonbasic) must be seen, at
best, as informal moral requirements or recommendations. I focus on the
contractarian version of the libertarian challenge as recently presented
by Jan Narveson. I claim that Narveson’s contractarian construal of
libertarianism is not only intuitively weak, but is also subject to
decisive internal problems. I argue, in particular, that it does not pro-
vide a clear rationale for distinguishing between informal duties of
virtue and enforceable duties of justice, that it can neither successfully
justify libertarianism’s protection of negative rights nor its denial of
positive ones, and that it fails to undermine the claim that basic
positive duties are duties of global justice.
1. Introduction
Are positive duties to help others in need mere informal duties
of virtue or can they also be enforceable duties of justice?1 In
this paper I defend the claim that some positive duties (which I
call basic positive duties) can be duties of justice against one of
the most important principled objections to it. This is the
libertarian challenge, according to which only negative duties to
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avoid harming others can be duties of justice, whereas positive
duties (basic or nonbasic) must be seen, at best, as informal
moral requirements or recommendations. I focus on the contrac-
tarian version of the libertarian challenge as recently presented
by Jan Narveson.2 I proceed as follows. First, I clarify some con-
cepts central to our discussion, such as the notions of negative
and positive duties, basic and nonbasic positive duties, perfect
and imperfect duties, duties of virtue and duties of justice, and
domestic and global duties (section 2). Next, I reconstruct
Narveson’s construal of the libertarian challenge (sections 3
and 4), and then show that it is seriously flawed (section 5).
Narveson’s contractarian construal of libertarianism is not only
intuitively weak but is also subject to decisive internal problems.
I argue, in particular, that it does not provide a clear rationale
for distinguishing between informal duties of virtue and
enforceable duties of justice, that it can neither successfully
justify libertarianism’s protection of negative rights nor its
denial of positive ones, and that it fails to undermine the claim
that basic positive duties are duties of global justice.
2. Some Preliminary Definitions
Before addressing the libertarian challenge to the claim that
there can be basic positive duties of justice, it is important to
clarify what the alleged category of “basic positive duties of
justice” is. I do this by means of a set of distinctions. The first is
the distinction between negative and positive duties. To say that
an individual A has a negative duty to another individual B
with respect to a certain object O is to say that A ought not to
harm B by depriving them of access to O. A harms B, for
example, when A rapes B, as B is thereby deprived of access to
physical integrity. To say, on the other hand, that A has a
positive duty to B with respect to O is to say that A ought to
assist B in gaining or maintaining access to O. A fulfills a
positive duty to B when, for example, A takes B to the hospital
in an emergency, thereby assisting B in gaining access to (the
restoration of) a healthy condition.
A second important distinction is that between basic and
nonbasic positive duties. This distinction ranges over the objects
of positive duties. A basic positive duty is one focused on objects,
access to which is a necessary condition for the recipient to live
a minimally decent life. A nonbasic duty is one whose object is
above the threshold of what is necessary to live a minimally
decent life. Identifying the set of objects belonging to the
category of basic positive duties is, of course, a matter of contro-
versy. We may have different accounts of what a (minimally or
otherwise) decent life is. However, most of us will agree that
such a life would at least include access to food and water,
health care, education, and housing. Someone who does not
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have access to such goods can be characterized as destitute,
needy, or severely poor. In the remainder of this paper, I will
assume that basic positive duties are duties to do one’s fair share
in assisting others in gaining and maintaining access to this
minimal set of objects satisfying their most basic needs.3 To
simplify the discussion, I will also assume that the beneficiaries
of these duties are not responsible for their condition of need.
There are two further distinctions that will be crucial for our
discussion. These are the distinction between perfect and
imperfect duties, on the one hand, and between duties of justice
and duties of virtue, on the other. These two distinctions are
often conflated. But I think that it is important to keep them
separate. The distinction between perfect and imperfect duties
is the following. A has a perfect duty to B with respect to O
when it is clear that B has a claim against A as to when and
how A has to fulfill such obligation. Thus, if the duty is nega-
tive, we know when and how it is that A is not to deprive B of
access to O. If the duty is positive, we know when and how it is
that A is (to do their fair share in order) to provide B with
access to O. When a duty is imperfect, we cannot say that B has
a precise claim against A with respect to O, as we cannot say
when or how A is to fulfill their duty. Imperfect duties afford
duty-bearers significant latitude as to when and how they are
fulfilled. The duty to be generous with other people is an
example of an imperfect duty. We must be generous with others
in some cases and to some extent. But no one can claim, in any
given occasion, that we be generous with them. The duty not to
rape is, on the other hand, a perfect duty. It is clear that
anyone has a claim against you that you do not rape them at
any time.
I said that we should not conflate the distinction between
perfect and imperfect duties with the distinction between duties
of virtue and duties of justice. The reasons are twofold. The first
is that not all perfect duties might be said to be duties of
justice. For a duty to be a duty of justice, it must not only involve
a claim on the part of the recipient, but that claim must also be
an enforceable one. More precisely, when we talk about the
distinction between virtue and justice, we talk about the
distinction between informal interpersonal duties and duties we
have, in principle, reason to hold as legally enforceable if their
legal enforceability is necessary for their fulfillment. Thus, the
duty not to break a promise might be a perfect duty, but we
may not want to consider all of its instances as being legally
enforceable (though we may select a subset of them as so
being, such as in the case of contracts involving transference
of property). Justice ranges over particularly important duties
whose fulfillment we are prepared to secure by means of public
coercion. Duties of justice have, as a correlate, certain rights
(i.e., justifiably enforceable claims). If A has a duty of justice to
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B with respect to O, then B has a right against A regarding A’s
fulfillment of their requirements with respect to O.4
The second reason for avoiding a conflation between the
imperfect/perfect and virtue/justice distinction is that we may
face situations in which certain general duties are imperfect but
should be made perfect as a result of recognizing their relevance
from the point of view of justice. The protection of people
against serious physical harm by others may be said to be a
duty of justice, in the sense that it is focused on guaranteeing
people’s access to an extremely important object (physical
integrity) and that we have, in principle, reason to secure its
fulfillment by coercive means if necessary. However, it may not
be clear who should do what in order to implement this duty of
protection, and thus the recipients of protection have no precise
claim against specific individuals. The negative duty not to
physically assault others is a perfect one. But the duty to protect
people from physical assault is not. Any individual might have
latitude to decide whom to protect and how to protect them.
However, given the reasons of justice mentioned, we must recog-
nize the obligation to develop institutional structures clearly
specifying some forms of protection and, thus, make the claim to
protection more precise. These structures would generate, out of
the general duty to protect, which is imperfect, a set of specific
duties, which are perfect (such as the duties of policemen and
lawyers, the duties of taxpayers to sustain the public institu-
tions dealing with security, and so on). Thus, imperfect duties
are dynamic and can be partly specified as perfect duties once
their status as duties of justice is recognized.5
The core contentious issue to be addressed here is whether
there are basic positive duties that can be deemed duties of
justice. For this to be the case, we must show that there are
good reasons for taking them to involve correlative rights on the
part of the needy. Libertarians deny that this can be done. In
what follows, we will consider Narveson’s case for such denial.
But before addressing the libertarian challenge, I should
mention one last distinction, this time focused on the scope of
duties (i.e., on their domain of application). This is the distinc-
tion between domestic and global duties. Global duties are those
that apply to all human beings who can be agents or recipients
of them,6 whereas domestic duties are those that range over
relations between compatriots. This distinction is not so central
for libertarians like Narveson, who assume that claims of
justice are in principle universal, made by anyone against
everyone else.
3. The Libertarian Challenge
The general question before us is: Do we have reason to see
some basic positive duties as duties of justice? An affirmative
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answer to this question needs to show that basic positive duties
can be made perfect and be seen as having correlative rights.
The first part of the answer poses no serious conceptual
problem, though it does demand a careful discussion of efficient
and fair institutional mechanisms. Basic positive duties to do
our fair share to contribute to the satisfaction of others’ basic
needs can be made perfect if we identify subjects in need and
agents able to contribute to their satisfaction without unreason-
able sacrifice on their part. The second part of the answer is
less easy to articulate. It is clear that we can articulate a set of
socioeconomic rights. Article 25 of the 1948 Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights mentions a set of rights to have basic
needs met. Some national constitutions (such as the French and
the South African constitutions) state socioeconomic rights, and
forms of legislation have been developed to specify modes of
fulfillment of them. There is, then, no conceptual impossibility
of articulating socioeconomic rights focused on basic needs as
correlated with certain sets of duties on the part of individuals
and governments. These duties, given the specification of the
correlative rights and forms of fulfillment, can thereby be seen
as perfect and enforceable (i.e., as duties of justice). The most
serious question is not whether this construal is coherent but
whether it is justifiable on substantive grounds. Defenders of
basic socioeconomic rights say that their satisfaction must be
advocated by any reasonable conception of justice that recog-
nizes the moral importance of the urgent interest of all humans
in having access to the most basic conditions of a minimally
decent life. Libertarians, however, deny that these right claims
can be justified.7
The central libertarian complaint against enforcement of
positive duties (basic or nonbasic) is that it involves violation of
people’s right to do whatever they want with what is rightfully
theirs (as long as they do not thereby harm other people). A
classical formulation of this claim is given by Robert Nozick.
According to Nozick, positive duties cannot be duties of justice
as well as duties of virtue because their enforcement involves
an unacceptable “continuous interference with people’s lives.”8
Such continuous interference is unavoidable if basic positive
duties are to be enforced (for example by means of taxation)
against the will of resourceful people who do not want to con-
tribute to improving the condition of those in need. The only
contribution compatible with the right to dispose freely of
what is rightfully ours is voluntary transference in accordance
with the slogan “from each as they choose, to each as they are
chosen.”9
Nozick’s construal of the libertarian challenge has been
subject to several criticisms. I will not rehearse them here.10
The debate between Nozickean libertarians and their liberal
and socialist opponents seems to have reached an impasse. The
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former appeal to the intuition that nobody can be forced to
comply with demands that are positive rather than negative
unless such demands amount to compensation for previous
harms for which the addressees of the demands are causally
responsible. The latter, on the other hand, appeal to the intui-
tion that a just society must introduce mechanisms (even
coercive ones) compensating those who are disadvantaged due
to natural or social circumstances beyond their control. According
to liberal and socialist philosophers, the second intuition is
sufficient for grounding some limitations to the economic free-
dom of resourceful people, whereas for Nozickean libertarians
the first intuition supports absolute “side constraints” against
any limitation of individuals’ property rights. Narveson’s
construal of the libertarian challenge is peculiar in that it
attempts to overcome this impasse by appealing to a contrac-
tarian framework of normative justification capable of arbitra-
ting the conflict between these (and other) intuitions.
4. Narveson’s Construal
of the Libertarian Challenge
Unlike Nozick, Narveson suggests that we reach the conclusion
that only negative duties can be duties of justice without
appealing to any normative intuitions. Narveson’s strategy is to
ground the libertarian claim by appealing to a contractarian
framework based on a criterion of “mutual advantage,” according
to which we should follow only those norms to which rational
persons would agree, given some “obvious, normal facts about
people and their situations.”11 This line of argument is, according
to Narveson, of a universalist nature, yielding rules for all
human beings. The libertarian claim that only negative duties
are duties of justice is thus a claim whose scope is both domes-
tic and global.
To unpack Narveson’s argument, we can start by quoting
and refining his core claims as helpfully stated in the abstract
of his article “Welfare and Wealth.”12 They are the following:
[A1] “There is no sound basis for thinking that we have a general
and strong duty to rectify disparities of wealth around the
world, apart from the special case where some become
wealthy by theft or fraud.”
[A2] A “rational morality” must be “built on the interests of all.”
[A3] Such interests “include substantial freedoms, but not
substantial entitlements to others’ ‘assistance’.”
[A4] “The situation of the world’s poor is not that of victims of
disasters, but simply of less-developed technology, which
can be repaired by full and free trade relations with others.”
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[A5] “The true savior of the world’s poor is the businessman,
not the missionary. What we need to do is to strike down
barriers to commerce, rather than requisition ‘aid’.”
To focus our discussion, the following clarifications are
necessary. First, theses [A4] and [A5] are largely empirical
claims. I will address them briefly at the end of this paper, but
for the most part my focus will be on [A1]-[A3]. My main ques-
tion is whether assisting people for whose poverty neither we
nor they are clearly responsible is a duty of justice. [A1] says
that this would not be the case.
[A1] denies that general positive duties to rectify disparities
of wealth around the world can be strong enough to be deemed
duties of justice. The grounds for this denial are briefly outlined
in [A2] and [A3]. [A2] announces Narveson’s view of the founda-
tions of normative argument, which he identifies with mutual
advantage contractarianism. [A3], on the other hand, is the
general normative claim yielded by applying [A2] (given the
“obvious, normal facts about people and their situations”) and
grounding [A1]. [A3] simply states the central normative
libertarian principle that only negative duties have correlative
entitlements (i.e., rights) in the contractarian language focused
on “the interests of all.”
Since our focus will be neither the eradication of poverty in
general nor the elimination of wealth disparities, but the reason-
able assistance on the part of wealthy people to those who
suffer severe poverty due to lack of satisfaction of basic needs, a
more circumscribed version of [A1] will be addressed, namely:
[A1*] There is no sound basis for thinking that we have a basic
positive duty of justice to assist those in need when we can
at no grievous cost to ourselves unless we are causally
responsible for their condition of need.
Narveson himself argues for something like [A1*] in his article
“We Don’t Owe Them a Thing!” where he claims that the duty
to help those in need (the severely poor who are very badly off)
when we can do it at no grievous cost to ourselves is not an
“enforceable duty” of justice but only at best a duty of virtue
that falls “beyond strict justice.”13 The argument for this claim
is, again, an appeal to what rational persons would agree to
when setting up a “social contract” selecting mutually advan-
tageous rules of interaction.
Let us examine in some detail Narveson’s use of the contrac-
tarian standard of normative justification to defend the libertar-
ian conception of justice. The central puzzle here is whether a
morality of mutual advantage would ground a conception of
justice focused only on negative duties. Why would basic posi-
tive duties not be recognized as enforceable obligations of jus-
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tice? Narveson’s answer is that a morality of mutual advantage
would yield, as an account of what can be coercively enforced,
only a set of negative rights. To assess this answer, we need
first to clarify (1) Narveson’s account of what a morality of
mutual advantage is; (2) his view that negative duties can be
duties of justice; (3) his claim that positive duties, including
basic ones, cannot be duties of justice; and (4) his view of virtue
and justice as having cosmopolitan scope.
4.1 Narveson’s contractarianism
Narveson claims that the test for the correctness of a norm is
not whether it fits someone’s intuitions. We have different
intuitions, and it is not clear that appealing to them will
provide reasons that someone who does not have them would
accept. We can assume that “people are more or less rational,
in a public sense—they are capable of addressing intelligible
claims and statements to each other, in the hope or expecta-
tion that they will be accepted by those to whom they are
addressed.” But we cannot assume that their “interests, desires,
values,” in short their “utilities,” immediately converge. Given
this fact of widespread evaluative disagreement and the
obvious environmental fact that there are not enough resources
to fully satisfy everyone’s interests, we need a mechanism for
reaching rational agreements that does not assume what we do
not yet have.14 Such mechanism is, according to Narveson, what
the standard of “mutual advantage” provides:
Mutual advantage says, simply, that a configuration which is better
for all relevant actors, and no worse for anyone else, is morally
preferable to one which is not, unless there is a prior wrong to
correct.15
In defending this standard, Narveson appeals to the
“profound” “Pareto idea” requiring that “no one ‘lose’.”16 The
Pareto idea is commonly used to compare different states of
affairs in terms of their impact on people’s interests (or “utili-
ties”). This idea has in fact two versions, a strong one and a
weak one. According to the strong version, a state of affairs X in
which there is generalized compliance with a rule R is superior
to another state of affairs Y where there is not generalized
compliance with R if everyone is better off (in terms of their
“utilities”) in X than in Y. According to the weak version, X is
superior to Y if at least one person is better off and no one is
worse off. In his presentation of the standard of mutual
advantage quoted above, Narveson seems to focus on the strong
version of the Pareto idea. The contractarian view he defends
says that a rule is correct if it is rationally acceptable to those
affected by it, and this just means that the parties involved can
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see a situation of general compliance with the rule as Pareto
superior (in the strong sense) to the alternatives. At some points
Narveson’s approach seems, however, to be flexible between the
different versions of the Pareto idea, allowing for degrees.
The obvious direction is up: we want the rules to enable all to
advance, and at a minimum to prevent people from being pushed
in the wrong direction, backward. It seems to me that this classical
case is enormously strong, and not of a type that can be seriously
shaken by appeals to intuition.17
4.2 Negative duties as duties of justice
How can people seek beneficial outcomes from their interactions
with other people? There are several legitimate ways of doing
this, according to Narveson. These include avoiding others when
interaction with them would be detrimental and attempting to
get them to benefit us by asking for their help or by offering a
mutually beneficial joint venture (such as a market transaction
involving the exchange of desirable goods).18  What we cannot
do, according to Narveson, is to exact benefits from others by
means of coercion. When it comes to the use of coercion, “the
indicated rule is: Do not! Do not, that is, unless it is necessary
in order to ward off or defend oneself or others from persons
violating this very rule.”19
Narveson’s justification of this rule, which he calls “the basic
principle of right,” is brief:
Why is this the indicated rule? The reasoning is familiar since
Hobbes at least. Any normal person can do this sort of thing, every
normal person (and almost all others) would be very adversely
affected by others’ doing it, and the obvious agreement is to rule it
out. General resort to force makes life worse for all.20
A contractarian approach would then ground the principle of
right according to which no force can be used on others unless it
is required as a response to their own use of force. This prin-
ciple is justifiable because a situation in which it is not recog-
nized would be worse for all, as all share the strong interest in
not being coerced by others (i.e., would be “very adversely
affected” by others’ use of coercion against them).
4.3 Positive duties might be duties of virtue, but
cannot be duties of justice
The principle of right accepts coercion only if it is necessary to
protect negative rights or to secure rectification for their viola-
tion, and thus as enforcement of negative duties. This is in tune
with Narveson’s libertarianism, according to which “we all have
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one single, fundamental right—the right to liberty.”21 Narveson
denies that coercion can be also used to secure compliance with
positive duties. He recognizes that help to others in need when
the costs to the contributors would not be too high is something
that we should recognize as a demand of moral virtue. But he
does not see it as a demand of justice. Enforcing positive duties
would be inconsistent with the libertarian principle of right
according to which only negative rights can be coercively
protected.
Our fundamental right to liberty is negative, not positive. The
reasoning behind that is straightforward. A positive right, by
definition, cuts further into our liberty than the corresponding
negative one: if you are forced to help others in need, then you do
not have your choice whether to help them. Yet your not helping
them does not cut into the liberty of the victims: it does not disen-
able them from doing whatever they can do anyway—which, to be
sure, is not much. But it does not worsen their situations as com-
pared with what they are at the time when action could take place.
Instead, it merely leaves them no better off.22
Libertarianism “denies that we owe assistance to anyone.”
Positive claims to receive assistance are not coercively enforce-
able. They are, at best, “reinforceable” (subject to informal
practices of encouragement and criticism).23
4.4 Global scope
Narveson sees the points discussed in 4.1 through 4.3 as having
universal, or cosmopolitan, scope. The duty not to harm others
is universal, owed to distant others as well as to fellow nationals.
The duty to assist others in need is neither enforceable domes-
tically nor globally. It is, however, a duty of virtue whose scope
is in principle universal. The only case in which helping distant
others is not (or is less) morally mandatory is when higher costs
are involved. “Although distance usually makes a difference in
cost, when it doesn’t, distance has no differential effect on our
duties.”24
5. Defending Basic Positive Duties of Justice
Against Narveson’s Challenge
There is much in Narveson’s challenge that warrants critical
scrutiny. In his recent response to Narveson, Larry Temkin
points out, quite convincingly in my view, that Narveson has
failed to portray egalitarian conceptions of justice in a fair way,
and thus much in his criticism of them is beside the point.
Temkin has also shown that Narveson’s dismissal of the appeal
to intuitions fails to recognize the extent to which contractar-
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ianism itself relies on intuitions (for example, on the “profound”
“Pareto idea” as bedrock for judging moral improvements).
Finally, Temkin argues that positive duties to assist those for
whose condition of need we are not responsible may be con-
sidered demands of justice once we recognize that there are
some nonagent relative standards of assessment. Temkin does
not, however, “claim that we [the relatively wealthy] owe the
world’s poor aid, at least if that implies that they have a right
to such aid.”25 Temkin thus leaves Narveson’s crucial thesis that
the needy do not have rights to assistance by those who can
contribute at no grievous cost to themselves untouched. In what
follows, I challenge Narveson’s thesis that there are no basic
positive rights. This is, after all, perhaps the central contro-
versial claim by libertarians and needs to be addressed directly.
5.1 Intuitive complaints
A common critique of mutual advantage contractarian
conceptions of justice is that they lead to counterintuitive
results. According to mutual advantage contractarianism, A and
B have reason to accept a rule R when R is mutually advan-
tageous to them. Assume, however, that A is quite wealthy and
strong and that B is weak and starving. Since B would neither
be able to greatly benefit nor seriously harm A, it is not obvious
that A would rationally agree to R if R demands that A
contribute to the satisfaction of the basic needs of B. A would
prefer alternative rules. Examples would be R*, under which A
is allowed to let B starve to death, or R**, under which A can
offer B a job whose result is great profit for A and a very bad
salary for B. Since neither under R* nor under R** A makes B’s
condition worse (and in fact under R** B ’s condition is
improved), it is not wrong for A to accept R* or R** instead of
R. These outcomes, of which there are unfortunately plenty of
historical examples, seem intuitively repugnant.26  The reason is
that they assume an uncritical recognition of the bargaining
power of the wealthy and strong when its use involves complete
disregard for the predicament of the poor and weak (as is the
case in R*), or their exploitation (as is the case in R**). As
Brian Barry forcefully put it, “justice as mutual advantage fails
egregiously to do one thing that we normally expect a concep-
tion of justice to do, and that is provide some moral basis for
the claims of the relatively powerless.”27
I find this intuitive argument compelling. But Narveson and
other mutual advantage contractarians might not be moved by
it. They would, in fact, say that it is question begging. Intui-
tions, for them, cannot be used to challenge the results of a con-
tractarian argument because the latter is precisely introduced
in order to arbitrate clashes of disparate intuitions. One can,
and I think must, respond to this rebuttal by appealing to
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Rawls’s idea of “reflective equilibrium,” showing that contrac-
tarian procedures and intuitive judgments interact rather than
being unilaterally foundational with respect to each other.28 In
what follows I want, however, to provide a more internal criti-
cism of Narveson’s rejection of basic positive duties of justice. I
will show that even on its own terms, the contractarian pro-
posal, as presented by Narveson, fails to provide a decisive
argument.
5.2 From duties of virtue to duties of justice
A first internal problem with Narveson’s approach is that it
does not tell us clearly what sorts of considerations should
determine our viewing a duty as one of justice besides one of
virtue. Narveson does say that a duty of justice involves
coercively enforceable rights, but he does not clearly tell us in
virtue of what a duty should be seen as having such correlative
rights. By analyzing his texts we find, however, two sets of
considerations aimed at showing that negative duties have,
unlike basic positive duties, the privilege of being also duties of
justice. Both considerations fail, however, to show that (at least
basic) positive duties should not also be seen as duties of
justice.
A preliminary concern regarding promoting positive duties
to the status of duties of justice is, as we saw, that positive
duties might be imperfect. But Narveson himself says that we
can improve on the common view that these duties afford
agents completely indeterminate latitude. What is really
important here is that agents’ limited resources be taken into
account when deciding what duties to assist others they have.29
The relation between costs and benefits of assistance for the
agent and the subject can be assessed and reasonable targets
(which do not involve sacrificial altruism on the part of the
agent) can be identified. Furthermore, institutional mechanisms
can be introduced for this purpose, identifying kinds of basic
need and circumstances under which persons may be demanded
to contribute in significant but nonsacrificial ways. Basic
positive duties may be construed as people’s duty to do their
fair share in contributing to ongoing collective practices of
assistance to those in need. The problem then is whether such
institutional mechanisms, involving for example compulsory
taxation by the state, should be introduced.
Narveson’s first consideration here is that informal mechan-
isms of contribution (such as “charity concerts”) “are preferable
to compulsory contribution” because they are “[a] more fun than
paying taxes, and, [b] being genuinely charitable, also far more
recommendable.” Narveson also says that [c] these methods
“work so well that there would arguably be no need for state
support even if there weren’t a moral case against it.”30 Con-
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sideration [a] seems quite weak. For some people it might be
“more fun” to go to charity concerts than to pay taxes. But
proper allocation of tax funds may go a longer way in efficiently
channeling funds to satisfy basic needs. Thus the benefit to
the needy of the taxation mechanism may be larger. On the
other hand, it may be less burdensome to pay taxes than to
assist all the charity concerts one would have a duty to go to if
one is to seriously discharge one’s basic positive duties. Further-
more, reasonable taxation would make sure that every citizen
indeed contributes their fair share toward the satisfaction of
the basic needs of others.31 Consideration [b] is important and
hard to disagree with. But just as people may contribute to
informal charity funds out of genuine solidaristic motives, so
can they pay their taxes out of solidaristic motives. Mixed, or
nonsolidaristic motives, can be present in both cases. The
decisive consideration here is, in the end, [c]. This is an
empirical claim according to which informal charity does more
to assist the needy than compulsory taxation. This is an
intriguing claim, for which Narveson provides no supporting
argument. Overwhelming historical evidence suggests, how-
ever, that the introduction of the welfare state in Western
countries involved a huge leap forward in terms of satisfaction
of basic needs of the population as compared to mere informal
charity existing under the previous, more laissez faire forms of
capitalism.32
So it seems that further argument is needed to show that we
do not have reason to promote basic positive duties to the status
of duties of justice. In [c] Narveson intimates that a further,
“moral case” might be made against compulsory contribution.
He immediately says that, actually, there is such a moral case
to be made: [d] “Taking involuntarily from Jim to be ‘charitable’
to Judy is not right; nor is taking from first-world taxpayers in
order to feed starving folks on the other side of the globe.”
Narveson thus rejects the view that “taxpayers’ money is up for
grabs, to be spent as enlightened intellectuals direct, rather
than as the unenlightened earners of that money would spend
it if they had their choice.”33
The problem with [d] is, however, that it is obviously ques-
tion begging. People’s absolute right to their pretax income is
precisely what Narveson should be trying to prove here.
Narveson might revert here to the argument, mentioned above,
leading to the libertarian principle of right: everybody would be
worse off if there were no prohibition against public encroach-
ment upon their liberty to do as they want with what they
possess. But we still need to know whether the interest in not
being taxed is among the important freedoms to be protected by
the principle of right. Not all freedoms are equally important
(or even important at all). Liberals who support public taxation
to assist the needy do, for example, recognize a set of liberties
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that must be respected by any state (such as physical integrity,
freedom of the press, of political participation, of association, of
religion, and so on).34 A separate argument is needed to show
that people’s interest not to be taxed is more important than
the interest in there being public institutions securing reason-
able (nonsacrificial) contribution to those in dire need. Since
people obviously have an important interest in being assisted
by others in situations of dire need, a contractarian argument
balancing the relative weight of this interest against the
interest in not being taxed is needed. I turn now to what that
argument might be.
5.3 Baselines, bargaining power, and abstraction
Does the inconvenience of being taxed (assuming that taxation
is progressive, exacting more from those who have more, and
focused on basic assistance to those in need) have more weight
than the security that one’s basic needs would be met if one
could not satisfy them on one’s own? Narveson indeed claims
that a “social contract” would recognize the importance of duties
to aid the needy. But he does not think such duties would be
duties of justice, because some people’s position would be
severely worsened by compulsory contribution. To see whether
this argument works, we need to make explicit what the
conditions of bargaining within the game of mutual advantage
contractarianism are.
Larry Temkin correctly points out that Narveson fails to
address the crucial problems of justifying the relative positions
of power of bargainers and the baselines of comparison of
options when setting up a contractarian argument.35 In what
follows I will further argue that Narveson actually operates
with different descriptions of the parameters of bargaining in
different cases. This is not surprising for, as I will show,
Narveson is bound to face a devastating dilemma: the more
information about their situation bargainers are allowed to use
in their deliberations, the less likely the social contracts are to
even yield negative duties, whereas the less information bar-
gainers can rely on, the more likely the social contracts are to
yield basic positive duties of justice.
In his argument defending the existence of basic positive
duties as informal duties of virtue, Narveson claims that all
rational persons recognize that they might face situations in
which they will not be able to satisfy their basic needs on their
own:
The cliché says “You never know”—but like so many clichés, it has
truth. We are all vulnerable to accident, disease, and what-have-
you, and there’s a fair chance that we will need somebody’s help,
without room for commercial arrangement.36
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The truth in the “You never know” cliché makes it rational even
for wealthy people to endorse a norm demanding help to those
in need. But why not take this norm as the basis for the
construction of a claim of justice? If everyone faces “a fair
chance” of needing basic objects whose supply they can not
secure by means of commercial arrangements, why not set up a
regime in which those who can contribute to the provision of
those objects at no grievous cost to themselves are compelled to
do so? Would not this be a prudent choice for all? Narveson’s
only way to reject this proposal is by means of appealing to the
different ex ante positions of the bargainers partaking in the
“social contract.” He proposes that we see them as following
“The Silver Rule” which includes consideration of “the likelihood
that we will be in situations where others could help us, as well
as the likelihood that we will be in situations where we could
help.”37 Since very wealthy and strong people know that the
likelihood of needing help for which they cannot pay is very low,
and the likelihood of being able to provide it to others at no
grievous cost to themselves is very high, they normally will, if
they are self-interested, reject a compulsory system of contribu-
tion and opt instead for an informal, voluntary one.
Now, if the Silver Rule is to be taken to heart, then it is not
clear that the strong and wealthy would accept a far-reaching
principle of right prohibiting all kinds of significant harm,
including the prohibition to seize others’ property. There might
be cases in which they would benefit more from harming the
poor and weak than from setting up cooperative ventures with
them.38 Even if they seriously looked for social arrangements
based on mutually advantageous rational agreement with those
relevantly affected, they need not be rationally moved to look
for the ones envisaged by libertarians. Assume that A is quite
wealthy and strong and that B is quite poor and weak. Since B
would neither be able to greatly benefit nor seriously harm A, it
is not obvious that A would rationally agree to rule R if R
demands A not to harm B in any significant way. A would be
worse off under R than under an alternative rule R* allowing
them to seize some of the resources controlled by B. A can get B
to agree to R* by saying to B that unless B goes along with R*
A is prepared to follow an even harsher rule R** under which A
seizes even more of the resources controlled by B.
Knowing that the likelihood of their being the object of
certain harms is very low, and the likelihood of their getting
away with doing the harm themselves is very high, the strong
and wealthy might rationally settle for arrangements of right
giving them special entitlements denied to the weak and poor
(at least for as long as their power supremacy is certain). In
other words, if we grant bargaining agents full appeal to their
ex ante power, the bargaining game need not yield “social
contracts” prohibiting all forms of significant harm. Libertarian-
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ism might not be the outcome of mutual advantage contrac-
tarianism.
Narveson might reply that a less than far-reaching principle
of right granting disproportionate prerogatives to the powerful
would not be acceptable because it would worsen the condition
of the weak who become the target of permitted harm. But this
answer would take for granted the current status quo as the
baseline of comparison. The powerful (and, with different aims,
the weak and poor) would say that a real bargain does not
merely compare a current scheme with a feasible alternative,
but all feasible alternatives (including the current scheme) at
once. Narveson provides no argument for convincing the power-
ful bargainer that their rebuttal is inadequate.39
The only way for Narveson to overcome the challenge posed
by the powerful is by increasing the abstraction in the descrip-
tion of the conditions of bargaining. On one occasion, Narveson
says that bargaining is “impartial,” meaning that bargainers
deliberate without knowing which side in the bargain they
really represent. Thus, in his criticism of egalitarianism,
Narveson says that egalitarianism, in recommending scheme (2)
instead of scheme (1) (see chart below), “violates impartiality.”
“On an impartial view of the matter, where the choosers did not
know whether they were in position of person A or of person B,
and if the choice were exclusively between (1) and (2), it would







Note: (1) through (5) are feasible basic distributive schemes. A
and B are the recipients. The chart shows what would be the
payoffs obtained by A and B under the different schemes,
assuming that A and B are self-interested and discounting their
comparative preferences. Assume, throughout, that 4.5 is the
threshold of basic needs satisfaction.
Disregarding Narveson’s obvious misinterpretation of what
egalitarians claim,41 it is clear that this clause assuming ignor-
ance would not only make bargainers avoid schemes involving
significant harm but would also make it pretty hard for them
not to see it as rational to accept a distributive scheme under
which basic positive duties of justice are recognized.42 Assume
that the comparison is now between schemes (1), (2), and (3).
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Certainly it is irrational to choose (2) over (1), as (2) would be
worse for all. But, would it be irrational to choose (3) over (1)?
Moving from (1) to (3) involves worsening the condition of B,
whereas moving from (3) to (1) involves worsening the condition
of A. Unless we take the status quo (be it (1) or (3)) for granted
(which we cannot when we are determining, at an abstract
level, the basic rules of a regime of cooperation), it seems that
the choice between (1) and (3) is, in terms of Pareto, indeter-
minate: what is rational for A is irrational for B and vice versa.
Assume now, however, that the bargainers do not know whether
they represent A or B, and that they know that 4.5 is the
threshold of basic needs satisfaction. Would it not be rational
for a bargainer, so described, to choose (3)? If the bargainer
winds up being A, they will have made sure that they will not
face starvation, homelessness, or easily curable mortal diseases.
If the bargainer winds up being B, they may not be as satisfied
as they could have been under (1), but the risk of being
destitute was pretty real, and it has been avoided while ending
up in a condition that is not so bad after all. Choosing (3) as a
regime of justice, sustained by coercive taxation if necessary to
secure its fulfillment, is the rational choice here. The reason is,
of course, that avoiding life threatening poverty is an urgent
interest (almost) any rational agent has.
To conclude, it is not clear that the strong libertarian prin-
ciple of right would be selected by rational bargainers. The prin-
ciple says that no basic positive duty can be enforced and that
no encroachment upon negative liberty can be permitted (except
as a response to harmful actions). However, if we allow bargain-
ers full access to their differential situations (including their
bargaining power and all feasible distributive schemes avail-
able), then some alleged negative duties will not be protected.
If, alternatively, we restrict the information available to
bargainers to secure impartiality in their negotiations, then
some positive duties will be seen as worthy of enforcement.
Either way, the libertarian principle of right prohibiting all
encroachment upon individuals’ negative liberty will not be the
focus of rational agreement.
Narveson’s libertarian case against basic positive duties of
justice therefore fails. He can only deny that basic positive
duties are duties of justice by allowing bargainers to mobilize
the full spectrum of their power and information. But this, as
we saw, blocks the justification of the sweeping libertarian
principle of right prohibiting all interference with negative
liberty. Narveson can attempt to short-circuit permissions of
encroachment upon negative liberty by denying bargainers full
access to their situational circumstances. But this, as we saw,
would make it rational for them to accept basic positive duties as
duties of justice and thus, again, to reject the sweeping liber-
tarian principle of right.
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5.4 Basic positive duties and global justice
The claim that A has a basic positive duty of justice to do their
fair share in aiding B entails (a) that A is relatively well off and
B faces destitution; (b) that avoiding destitution is an urgent
interest of (almost) any human being; and (c) that A can do
their fair share to contribute to the satisfaction of B’s basic needs
without grievous sacrifice. Given these conditions, it makes
sense to say that B has a right to A’s assistance. This right may
be said to connect with only an imperfect duty on the part of A.
However, as we saw, an institutional structure can be developed
so that the general collective duty of all those in a position like
A toward all those in a position like B can be specified in a set
of clearly delimited perfect duties. Now, can this cluster of
duties be said to have global scope? The enormous technological
capabilities and accumulated wealth in our contemporary world,
coupled with the increasing inequality in their distribution, and
the fact that 18 million people die each year due to poverty-
related causes make this question very pressing.43
As we saw, Narveson does not think that assistance need
stop at national boundaries. “The thesis that fellow-countrymen,
just as such, are more deserving of life-saving aid than others is
prima facie incredible, and morally absurd.”44 Narveson does
have, however, at least three arguments against the claim that
there are global basic positive duties of justice. I will close this
paper by showing that none of them works.
The first concern is that aid to distant others might be quite
burdensome to the duty-bearers. Narveson complains about
those who ask the world’s rich to “shell out quite a lot of money
to the cause of handouts to the world’s badly-off,” or call for a
“huge” “redistribution” of resources.45 If assistance involved
grievous costs, then condition (c) as stated above would not be
met, and thus no basic positive duties could arise here. However,
the eradication of severe poverty would actually be quite cheap.
According to Thomas Pogge’s calculation, for example, sufficient
resources to eradicate severe poverty could be obtained if the
global rich gave up just 1.2 percent of their annual aggregate
income for some years.46 The situation we face is akin to one of
moving from scheme (4) to scheme (5) (see the chart), which
involves no serious dent in the budget of the global rich. An
impartial social contract could hardly find this move inappro-
priate.
A second complaint by Narveson is that global positive
duties of the sort discussed here cannot be duties of justice
(even if they were duties of virtue). The reason is that positive
contribution to others can only be enforceable if it is a form of
“restitution” for harms done. But we, the world’s rich, do not
have such a duty, because “our distant sufferers aren’t so because
we made them so.”47 The causes of severe poverty are largely
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endogenous to poor countries. There are two serious problems
with this argument. The first is that it assumes the sweeping
libertarian principle of right, for which Narveson, as we saw, did
not succeed at providing a compelling case. A second problem is
that, even if we see positive contribution as indirectly grounded
in negative duties not to harm, it is hardly true that the global
rich have not been seriously involved in harming the global poor.
Even if Narveson were right that destitution in poor countries
primarily results from their governments’ inefficient and
corrupt policies and their lack of encouragement of endogenous
productive and commercial practices, it would be a mistake to
think that the world’s rich are not implicated. The latter are
involved in a number of ways. Pogge’s recent work is, again,
quite illuminating in this respect. According to Pogge, the
global rich have been shaping the international political and
economic environment that makes it possible and desirable for
corrupt elites in poor countries to proceed as they do. Two
features of that order are what Pogge calls the “international
borrowing privilege” and the “international resource privilege”
(under which authoritarian elites in poor countries are inter-
nationally allowed, and even encouraged, to appropriate and
sell the natural resources of the countries they rule, and con-
tract public debt in their people’s name, with crippling political
and economic consequences).48 Furthermore, Narveson builds an
artificial opposition between government and business, seeing
the former as the main party responsible for harm to the poor
and the latter as their “savior.”49 There is ample evidence that
some sectors of the international business community have sup-
ported harmful corrupt governments.50
A final concern raised by Narveson is that “even if enforced
charity were justified, it would be unnecessary.”51 The solution
to world poverty is not foreign aid, as it tends not only to involve
stealing from the well-off, but also an inefficient hampering of
spontaneous economic development in poor countries. Foreign
aid (i) “puts the money at the mercy of the recipient government
—not the intended people;” (ii) is controlled by inefficient
bureaucracies that do not know what the best allocation of
resources would be; and (iii) unfairly subsidizes some sectors of
the economy at the expense of others. “The sensible, and only
really satisfactory alternative to schemes of ‘foreign aid’ is the
free market.”52 “Insofar as we can speak of a ‘problem’ of poverty
in the world, its solution certainly lies with the business com-
munity.”53
This final complaint by Narveson involves at least two mis-
takes. First, it is certainly true that “foreign aid” may be used
inefficiently, cementing the rule of corrupt elites and failing to
nourish “grassroots” small business and civil society. But no
serious advocate of foreign aid would quarrel with this claim
and would certainly ask for “smart” forms of aid precisely
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targeting small business and civil society. Second, it is dubious
that unrestricted free market is the panacea for the elimination
of severe poverty. Controlling markets was necessary for limiting
the spread of poverty in Western industrialized societies and
would be no less necessary at the global level. Actually, radical
forms of “liberalization” of markets in poor countries have
increased, not reduced, the levels of destitution.54 On the other
hand, Narveson recognizes that rich countries have harmed
poor countries by introducing unilateral trade barriers pro-
tecting their industries.55 But a response to this situation, if it
seriously aims at the eradication of severe poverty, need not be
a completely “free trade.” “Fair trade” may be a better idea, as it
would grant poor countries temporary entitlements to protect
their emerging industries from devastating competition with
industries from more developed countries. “Fair trade,” unlike
“free trade” would be more efficient in eradicating severe poverty.
It would however involve, of course, discharge of positive duties
on the part of members of rich countries.
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